SECOND WORLD WAR

1942: Japan

In barely more than four months from January until the beginning of May, 1942 Japan virtually completed the campaign of conquest initiated at the end of 1941. When the drive was over a large part of the world's colonies lay under a new master, and the British and American public was beginning to ask whether the old colonial system could ever be revived. The new Japanese empire represented a very powerful combination of territories, populations and resources. The Philippines, Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, Burma, Thailand and French Indo-China contained about 150,000,000 people, as well as crucial industrial raw materials and food crops, including oil, rubber, tin, and rice. The seizure of this vast wealth benefited Japan directly by helping to support its war machine and indirectly by depriving the United Nations of essential commodities.

Malaya; Fall of Singapore.

Japan's first major objective in 1942 was the seizure of Singapore, key British air and naval base on Singapore Island at the southern tip of British Malaya. Japanese tactics, simple and effective in character, consisted in the main of infiltrating the defenders' lines on the Malaya peninsula with troops carefully trained for jungle warfare and then executing enveloping actions. As a result, despite considerable bravery, the Indian, British, and Australian forces were unable to do more than fight a series of rearguard battles. This Japanese superiority in tactics was accompanied by outright superiority in the air. In numbers there was no great disparity, but Japanese forces were concentrated, while Imperial troops, at least in the beginning, were spread over the peninsula, giving the invaders the advantage at most points. The defense suffered also from the apathy of almost the entire native population and the treachery of a few who served the enemy as guides and spies. Perhaps most important of all was the colonial mentality of the rulers of Malaya and Singapore, who, supremely confident of their position, had never imagined the campaign as it actually occurred, but had always expected a naval assault which would be repulsed by Singapore's powerful guns.

From Dec. 7, 1941, when the invasion of Malaya began, it took the Japanese about nine weeks to reach the gates of Singapore. On January 12 they entered Kuala Lumpur, a great rubber center and Malaya's second most important city. Four days later Allied hopes rose when an Australian division came to the support of tired British and Indian troops, but despite an initial success against Japanese tanks the newcomers also had to retreat. Finally, on January 31, the defenders withdrew to Singapore Island, and the causeway connecting the mainland was breached by explosives. On Feb. 9, after days of artillery bombardment, the Japanese effected night landings on the island, duplicating their Hong Kong invasion tactics of the previous December. Within a day or two Japanese tanks were crossing the repaired causeway, and on Feb. 15 the Singapore garrison surrendered unconditionally. The Japanese claimed that 60,000 prisoners were involved.

Conquest of the Indies.

While advancing down Malaya, the Japanese prepared for the next phase of their campaign by establishing themselves on the outer islands of the Netherlands East Indies. Their object was to strip the main island of Java of the defenses represented by Borneo and the Celebes, as well as Singapore. The first landing on Dutch soil occurred early in January off the east coast of Borneo at Tarakan, site of valuable oil wells which the Dutch claimed to have destroyed. By Jan. 21 the northern arm of neighboring Celebes had been occupied. During the following week United States warships and Dutch and American aircraft sank or damaged many Japanese transports and naval vessels in the Macassar Strait direct sea channel between Borneo and Celebes leading to Java but this setback to the invaders was merely temporary. On Feb. 3 the main Indies naval base at Surabaya was raided for the first time, and within a week Batavia, the capital, likewise received its baptism from the air. On Feb. 14 parachute troops invaded Sumatra, the large island leading from Malaya to Java, and some days later Japanese forces secured a foothold on Bali, directly east of the main island. From these two points the invasion of Java was launched on Feb. 27 with landings that threatened Batavia and Surabaya. Although the Japanese had previously suffered significant ship losses, they succeeded, between Feb. 27 and March 1, in destroying or putting out of action the remaining United Nations naval forces in the Java Sea. Five Allied cruisers, six destroyers, and one sloop were sunk, depriving the Indies of their last maritime defenses. Superior in numbers and equipment at all points, the invaders seized Batavia on March 5 and shortly afterward overpowered the Allies at Bandung. Although sporadic resistance continued elsewhere in the islands, the defense of the Indies was, in effect, at an end. The only circumstance slightly unfavorable to the Japanese was the destruction of oil wells by the Dutch who, in contrast to the defenders of Malaya, carried out a carefully planned scorched-earth policy.

Burma Invaded and the Burma Road Closed.

At the same time a more extended campaign was being waged in British Burma, a key territory leading to India and linking China with foreign supplies by way of the Burma Road. The Japanese invasion began in mid-January, and by the second week in March the capital at Rangoon had fallen. Driving up the Irrawaddy River in the west, where the British were defending Prome, and up the Sittang in the east toward Chinese troops at Toungoo, the Japanese took full advantage of the British failure to establish effective military cooperation with the Chinese. In constant fear of being outflanked, the forces on each front were alternately obliged to retire by the withdrawal of their allies on the other. Toungoo was evacuated at the end of March and Prome early in April. Less than two weeks later, after destroying the oil fields, the British gave up Yenangyaung. On April 29 the Japanese seized Lashio, terminus of the Burma Road, and by May 5 they had reached the Chinese frontier, where they pushed across into Yunnan province.

Battle of the Philippines.

The path of conquest was more difficult in the Philippine Islands where Filipino and American troops under General MacArthur and his successor, General Wainwright, resisted for several months. Although the issue was never in doubt, the ability of the defenders to slow down the Japanese indicated the great power of colonial forces fighting for themselves. The majority of the men on Bataan peninsula off Manila Bay were Filipinos who had good reason to believe that after the war their country would become free and not remain an American possession. This and the quality of their leaders and fellow-American soldiers laid the basis for continuing resistance to numerically superior Japanese troops supported by tanks and dive bombers. On some occasions the United States forces even delivered temporary counterblows, as on Jan. 25, when the Japanese were driven back on Bataan. A week later an attempt to land on Corregidor, American island fortress in Manila Bay, was smashed after the invading launches and barges had been heavily bombarded. Throughout this period a small group of American torpedo boats used their meager strength against Japanese shipping, and the American air force, while its planes lasted, delivered several useful blows. In the latter part of February and the first three weeks of March there was a deceptive quiet on the part of the Japanese, who were preparing for the final assault while the defenders, who had been on short rations since early in January and lacked essential medicines, were growing physically weaker every day. The hopelessness of the situation was revealed on March 17 when General MacArthur arrived in Australia after leaving the Philippines at the order of President Roosevelt. Five days later Japanese General Yamashita demanded the surrender of the new American commander, General Wainwright, but received no answer.

The all-out Japanese assault was launched early in April, forcing the defenders to withdraw to new positions. On April 9, in replying to a Presidential message authorizing him to make any decision he considered necessary, General Wainwright referred to the seriousness of his position and the physical exhaustion of his men. In Washington the Secretary of War announced that there were less than 37,000 troops on Bataan facing between 200,000 and 300,000 Japanese. Supplies had been sent to Corregidor, but of every three ships almost two had been sunk. On April 10 General Wainwright reported that communications with Bataan had been cut for twenty-four hours. There followed almost a month of Japanese bombing attacks on Corregidor and the American-held Forts, Hughes, Frank, and Drum in Manila Bay. During the first four days of May, Corregidor alone was subjected to thirteen air raids a day. On the night of May 2 the Japanese effected a landing on the island, and on May 6 General MacArthur's headquarters in Australia announced that all the forts had surrendered. General Wainwright stayed behind with his men. On May 9 Japanese warships entered Manila harbor for the first time. This marked the end of all centralized resistance in the Philippines, but scattered guerrilla fighting was subsequently reported at various points. Although the Japanese occupied the leading centers in the Philippines, they did not attempt to establish a thorough occupation of the many islands.

War in China.

After the fall of southeast Asia, there was considerable speculation about future Japanese moves. One possibility was a final effort to knock China out of the war. In many respects conditions were increasingly favorable to the Japanese, for the closing of the Burma Road early in 1942 had contributed to a further deterioration of Chinese economic conditions, in addition to depriving the Chinese army of important foreign supplies and delivering a severe blow to Chinese morale. Yet, Japan made no effort to end the war of attrition that, by the end of 1942, was five and a half years old. Action was chiefly sporadic, and, as the year wore on, the Japanese were understood to be reducing their forces in China to something over half a million men, as compared with perhaps one million in the earlier phases of the war. There were, however, a few important developments. In the first week of January the third Japanese drive toward Changsha capital of Hunan province and an important economic center was broken with heavy losses for the invaders.

Early in May, when Japanese forces in Burma crossed the frontier into Yunnan province, they established themselves west of the Salween river. In mid-May a two-pronged attack was launched in the eastern provinces of Chekiang and Kiangsi, with one Japanese force pushing westward from Hangchow in Chekiang and another eastward from Nanchang in Kiangsi. Although the immediate object was to establish full control over the Chekiang-Kiangsi railway, part of which was still in Chinese hands, there was some fear that this might be the beginning of an all-out drive against China. The campaign was actually a limited one, probably intended to immobilize air bases that could be used for raids on Japan and to weaken China by further disrupting its economy. For two months the Japanese advanced, seizing the airfields and the entire railway as well as the Chekiang provincial capital at Kinhwa. Shortly after mid-July they began to retreat, and within a few weeks the Chinese were back in most of the towns and villages, except for Kinhwa itself. The nature of the withdrawal suggested that it had been voluntary, since the Chinese forces lacked the power to drive the Japanese out in such short order. Before leaving, the invaders thoroughly looted the area, killing large numbers of civilians and causing widespread damage.

Some Broken Offensives.

Any major concentration against China was, in fact, unlikely, since Japan had long ago decided that China could be dealt with only if the power of its allies was destroyed. Drives toward India, Australia, or Hawaii were greater possibilities, since any of these would directly weaken the positions of Britain and the United States. Against India no action was taken, despite Japanese radio propaganda beamed to that country and the bombing of some Indian cities early in April and of Calcutta in December. Tokyo's intentions toward Australia were more definite. First attacks on the Australian mainland occurred on Feb. 19, when Port Darwin was raided twice. In April the Japanese concentrated warships and transports at Lae and Salamaua on the northeast coast of New Guinea and at Rabaul on New Britain.

Battle of the Coral Sea.

Early in May two coordinated naval groups were sent south one to Tulagi, the best harbor in the southern Solomons, and the other into the Louisiade Archipelago off the eastern end of New Guinea. On May 4 American carrier-based planes sank or damaged a number of Japanese vessels at Tulagi, crippling that wing of the offensive an action carried through by a task force consisting of the carriers Lexington and Yorktown, and a number of cruisers and destroyers. The American vessels then moved into the Coral Sea, northeast of Australia, to deal with the second Japanese group. On May 6 planes from the Lexington sank a Japanese carrier, thought to be the new Ryukaku, and on the following day two more Japanese carriers were badly damaged. The American Yorktown was damaged only slightly, but the Lexington, which suffered internal explosions some time after being hit by bombs and torpedoes, had to be abandoned and sunk. This ended the Battle of the Coral Sea a defensive struggle of the United Nations that resulted in a severe setback for the Japanese.

Battle of Midway.

Whether the Japanese were attempting to cut American supply lines to the Far East via the south Pacific islands, or to initiate an invasion of Australia, or to divert American forces before delivering a blow elsewhere, a second sea offensive was not long delayed. Indeed, the United States had for some time known that Japan was assembling a large naval force in the central Pacific. The Yorktown therefore hurried to Pearl Harbor, where it was quickly put in shape before moving westward to Midway island, to join other American vessels. On June 3 an American pilot sighted the Japanese fleet, and for three days the planes of both sides attacked each other as well as enemy carriers. Although the Japanese at one point raided Midway from the air, they could not approach near enough by sea to carry through a naval shelling or to attempt a landing. In the course of the struggle, American planes sank four Japanese carriers, the Kaga, Akagi, Soryu and Hiryu, as well as the cruiser Mikuma. The United States lost the carrier, Yorktown, and the destroyer, Hammann. This second defensive victory following so quickly after that in the Coral Sea greatly improved the position of the United States in the Pacific, although by no means destroying Japan's offensive power.

Alaska and the Aleutians.

Although greatly removed in space, another Japanese attack far to the north was an integral part of the Battle of Midway. On June 3 two air raids were carried out against the American naval base at Dutch Harbor, Alaska. Later it became known that the Japanese had established themselves on the islands of Kiska, Attu and Agattu in the outer Aleutians. Had the Midway action succeeded and led to Japanese seizure of Hawaii, the Aleutian operations might have expanded into an invasion of Alaska and even the American Pacific coast. After the defeat at Midway, however, Japan's hold in the Aleutians was of minor significance. Yet, despite difficult weather conditions, American planes launched many attacks against the occupied island while American submarines operated against ships used to supply the enemy forces. At the end of August, United States troops landed in the Andreanof Islands, part of the Aleutian chain, and established bases from which fighter craft as well as bombers could raid Kiska, Attu, and Agattu. The Japanese evacuated the latter two islands at about this time, but later returned to Attu. Their position was very difficult, a fact that was underlined on December 27 when Premier Tojo declared that "the privations and difficulties which Japanese troops have had to endure in the Aleutian Islands are unimaginable."

Consolidating Conquered Areas.

Global strategy required that the United Nations concentrate the bulk of their military power against Germany, the heart of the Axis, while building up their strength in the Far East and waging the limited offensive actions necessary to prevent Japan from consolidating its new imperial positions. From Japan's point of view this was a crucial period in which it would have to make every effort to exploit the resources of Southeast Asia more rapidly than existing resources had to be used up. If successful in rebuilding its economy to make full use of the recently-won raw materials and manpower, Japan would be in an excellent position to meet a major Allied counteroffensive at a later date.

Early in the year there was a tendency in Allied circles to stress the effectiveness of a "scorched earth" policy in limiting Japan's gains. It soon became clear that, despite the damaging of some productive facilities by retreating British, Dutch, or American forces, the tactics of destruction were being applied only in haphazard and restricted fashion. Most of the sources of wealth including the rubber trees of Malaya and the Indies remained untouched. Wrecked oil wells could be restored to production, even though many months might be required. Toward the end of the year, for example, Allied planes from India attacked Japanese oil refining facilities in Burma at Yenangyaung, the scorching of which had been reported the previous spring. This simply bore out Soviet and Chinese experience that initial destruction must be accompanied by the continuing activity of guerrilla fighters, in order to be genuinely effective. There was little guerrilla resistance, however, among the unprepared, colonial peoples of Southeast Asia, except in the Philippines. There Japanese broadcasts admitted that American and Filipino troops were waging small-scale, hit-and-run warfare on a number of islands.

Japan's Course in the Philippines.

Few details were available concerning Japan's exploitation of the newly occupied areas, but the example of the Philippines was probably typical. There the Japanese used worthless military currency to empty shops and warehouses of their goods and encouraged the production of rice and cotton instead of sugar and other former export commodities. A system of forced savings was instituted, and an effort was made in certain areas to organize a network of "neighborhood associations," composed of units of 10 to 15 families, each group being collectively responsible for illegal acts committed by any member. At the same time an intensive propaganda campaign was launched to win over the people of the islands.

A Ministry of Greater East Asiatic Affairs Established.

The new problems of economic and political organization were enormous, especially since the various southern colonies had undergone different types of economic development and were at different political levels. To meet the crucial situation, a Ministry of Greater East Asiatic Affairs was established on Nov. 1 under Kazuo Aoki. The new Minister was to control all political, economic, and "cultural" activities in occupied Asia, except for areas directly ruled by the armed forces. His functions in this vast region included: control of foreign trade, development of natural resources, supervision of economic enterprises, and training of personnel, in addition to all matters previously under the Kwantung Bureau in Manchuria or the South Seas Board of the Foreign Office.

Deficiencies in Japanese Economy.

The primary difficulties of exploitation did not arise from any lack of available raw materials in Southeast Asia, but from two dangerous deficiencies in Japanese economy: (1) a shortage of shipping to carry vital commodities to Japan over long sea routes, and (2) a shortage of industrial facilities for processing purposes. Japan had begun the war with no great surplus of cargo vessels and during 1942 suffered considerable losses in merchant tonnage. On Dec. 8 American Secretary of the Navy Knox declared that the United States had destroyed between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 tons of such shipping, perhaps one-fourth of Japan's entire pre-war merchant fleet. This was, of course, offset somewhat by the seizure of United Nations vessels and shipbuilding facilities in the southward campaign as well as by Japan's domestic construction, but the situation was undoubtedly serious. The new areas, moreover, contained no significant modern industries, and Japan, unlike Germany, therefore, could not use conquered factory facilities to process conquered raw materials. Japan's own productive capacity, however, was low in comparison with that of other major powers and did not permit full utilization of available colonial manpower and natural resources.

Allied Counteroffensive in the Solomons.

All the Allied victories in the Pacific war whether at Changsha, in the Coral Sea, or at Midway had been defensive successes. On Aug. 7, in a first genuine offensive action, United States Marines effected surprise landings in the southern Solomons Islands, seizing Tulagi, Gavutu, and Tanombogo as well as a beachhead on Guadalcanal containing an airfield that had been almost completed by the Japanese. This move was probably hastened by the need of countering advances made elsewhere by the enemy. In late July Japanese forces had occupied Gona and Buna on the northeast coast of New Guinea and then pushed overland toward Port Moresby, a vital Allied position on the southern coast. Although the high Owen Stanley mountains lay in between and would have to be crossed, there was no reason to think that geography alone would stall the invaders. At the same time Japan's efforts to speed the completion of the Guadalcanal airfield pointed to plans for attacking Allied supply routes and positions in the southwest Pacific.

The drive into the southern Solomons was conceived of as a limited offensive by Allied strategists, but Japan regarded the campaign as a major challenge and made of the area an important naval battleground. On the night of Aug. 8-9 Japanese warships swept through the channel between Guadalcanal and Savo Island to the north in a night surprise attack and sank the American heavy cruisers, Astoria, Quincy, and Vincennes, together with the Australian cruiser, Canberra. This blow, in combination with subsequent Japanese air raids and surface shellings against the Guadalcanal beachhead, as well as submarine attacks on shipping made the supplying of the marines a very difficult problem for some time. The Japanese soon adopted a policy of trying to exhaust the Americans, while strengthening their own troops located west of the Guadalcanal airfield. Night after night small Japanese reinforcements were landed, and during the day there was constant air activity against American positions. On Aug. 24 a small Japanese aircraft carrier, the Ryuzo, was damaged or possibly sunk. On Sept. 15 Japanese submarines sank the 14,700-ton American carrier, Wasp. The marines withstood a severe Japanese assault against their lines in September and even stronger attacks in October. On Oct. 11-12 a United States task force sank one heavy Japanese cruiser, four destroyers, and a transport at a cost of one American destroyer and minor to moderate damage to other ships. In the last week of the month two Japanese carriers, two battleships, and three cruisers were damaged, while an American destroyer, the Porter, and an unnamed carrier were sunk. After this battle Secretary of the Navy Knox declared that the American forces had come through the "first round" in the Solomons, but warned that the Japanese would return.

Japan's most serious bid for reconquest of Guadalcanal came in November, but the American marines, who had been joined by Army men, were spared the problem of dealing with actual landings. In a great naval battle of Nov. 13-15, with carriers taking no part, Japan lost one battleship, a heavy cruiser or second battleship, eight cruisers, six destroyers, eight troop transports, four cargo vessels and from twenty to forty thousand men who went down. Following these blows to the enemy, Secretary Knox said on Nov. 20: "I think it is fair to say our hold on the island is very secure." Although it was possible that further Japanese attacks would be launched against Guadalcanal, Japan had clearly suffered heavy naval losses but at a cost to the American fleet. In addition, hundreds of Japanese planes had been destroyed, far exceeding the American air losses. The Solomons campaign, which had developed from a limited offensive into a slugging match, considerably altered the balance of forces in the Pacific.

Allied Campaign in New Guinea.

Late in August the Japanese attempted to seize Milne Bay, an important site at the eastern tip of New Guinea. Had this move been successful, they would have been in an excellent position to attack Port Moresby by sea, land and air, while continuing to move overland through the mountainous interior of the island. Allied military leaders had, however, foreseen the Milne Bay drive, and the invading Japanese were soon wiped out. Yet, defying geographical and climatic difficulties, the enemy infiltrated Allied lines in the Owen Stanley range, crossed through the gap at the highest point, and drove to within 32 miles of Port Moresby. In late September the tide suddenly turned, and they began to withdraw. One reason lay in constant United Nations air attacks against the tenuous Japanese supply lines. Japanese setbacks in the Solomons and the landing of American troops by plane far in the Japanese rear may also have had effect. In November, Australian forces, that had fought their way across the mountains from Port Moresby, reached the Gona-Buna area, where they pressed the Japanese back toward the sea. It was now announced that General MacArthur was leading the Allied troops in the field. Soon afterward the Americans entered the battle. Before the end of the year Gona had been captured, and the Buna beachhead was being reduced steadily in hard fighting.

American Raid on Tokyo and Other Allied Blows.

One of the most striking developments of the year was the American raid of April 18 on Tokyo, Yokohama, Kobe and Nagoya. All reports indicated that this exploit of American bombers under the command of Brigadier General later Major General James H. Doolittle caused great confusion in Japan. The attack was, however, an isolated incident occurring at a time when Allied fortunes in the Far East were at low ebb. By the end of the year it was evident that the air power available against Japan was expanding very rapidly. This was indicated by the considerable increase in recent types of American planes on the Southwest Pacific island front in particular. Yet, Japan clearly retained great offensive power, for action in the Solomons and New Guinea on the very fringe of the conquered area could not be decisive. If Japan was to be weakened in fundamental fashion, major land fighting, involving large armies would be necessary. A demand therefore arose for the reinvasion of Burma, in order to open the Burma Road anew and make possible the dispatch of more supplies to the existing land front in China. On Dec. 19 it was announced that British forces had crossed from India into Burma, but warnings were soon issued that only a section of General Wavell's forces was involved and that too much should not be expected from the action. The invaded area a coastal strip leading to the port of Akyab was geographically isolated from the rest of Burma, making other, more important drives necessary for the reconquest of the country.

Internal Affairs.

The Tokyo government apparently did not underestimate the difficulties that it had brought upon itself by initiating the war. On April 27 Premier Tojo declared that the coming stage of the struggle would be "a real test of the Japanese nation," in which the people must be "fully prepared to cope with any attack on Japan itself." Late in September, on the eve of the second anniversary of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, he stated that "British and American plans for a counteroffensive are beginning to take more definite form. The real developments of the war will be seen in the future." Especially toward the end of the year Japanese spokesmen sought to arouse the country to the problems that lay ahead. More and more frequently shipping difficulties were alluded to, and the admission was made that the conquest of Southeast Asia could not be expected to relieve shortages of civilian goods at home.

On April 30 a general election for the Japanese Diet took place, and on May 2 the Premier announced a sweeping victory for "government-recommended" candidates, who carried over 80 per cent of the seats. In view of a complete lack of information about the campaign, it was impossible to say what significance should be attached to the fact that almost 20 per cent of the seats went to other nominees. Toward the end of May the Diet convened to approve an extensive government shipbuilding program. On Sept. 1 the Foreign Minister, Shigenori Togo, resigned, and the Premier assumed his post temporarily. At the same time plans were announced for a Ministry of Greater East Asiatic Affairs. These Cabinet changes involved a considerable reduction in the powers of the Foreign Office and seemed to indicate a strengthening of the Premier's position. Later in the month Masayuki Tani was appointed Foreign Minister. In December the Diet convened again, and the Premier issued a warning that the United Nations were preparing counterblows of "great importance."

Foreign Affairs.

Relations with the Soviet Union.

Relations with the Soviet Union constituted one of the most important aspects of Japanese foreign policy. Throughout the year peace was maintained, since Japan did not find conditions favorable for an attack, while it was to the interest of both the U.S.S.R. and the United Nations that Soviet strength should be concentrated against Germany. Early in 1942 the Soviet-Japanese fisheries agreement was renewed for another twelve months, but the rents to be paid by the Japanese were raised and the number of fishing lots was reduced. On the anniversary of the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of April, 1941, the Soviet newspaper Pravda warned Japan of the dangers of "an annexationist war in the north." Later a new Soviet Ambassador to Tokyo was named. During the summer there were many rumors of an impending Japanese drive against Siberia, speculation which reached its height with the shake-up in the Japanese Cabinet, since the retiring Foreign Minister had been connected with the conclusion of the Neutrality Pact and had formerly been an Ambassador to Moscow. At the end of the year, however, relations remained formally correct.

Treatment of Prisoners

Considerable discussion was aroused in the United States and Britain by Japan's treatment of civilian and military prisoners. On March 10 Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, told the House of Commons that escaped eyewitnesses had confirmed previous accounts of Japanese atrocities. Early in May he stated that conditions in the Hong Kong and Shanghai prisoners' camps were understood to have improved somewhat. In August two boatloads of westerners, chiefly Americans arrived in the United States under a Japanese-American exchange agreement. Although there were some exceptions, these missionaries, business men, newspaper correspondents and teachers by-and-large reported that they had been treated badly or even subjected to brutality. Perhaps the greatest difficulty was that the foreigners confined in Japan had been obliged to get along on a meager Japanese diet. One American missionary in Korea was given the "water cure" and beaten with a rubber hose. The publisher of an anti-Japanese weekly in Shanghai contracted beri beri and gangrene because of the conditions under which he was imprisoned and lost part of both feet as a result. In general, these reports increased America's determination to administer a thorough and crushing defeat to Japan.

Successful Invasion of the Solomons.

The year 1942 saw the Marine Corps launch and successfully carry out America's first land offensive of World War II, when it carried the fighting to the enemy by invading the Solomon Islands in August. This attack, the Leathernecks' outstanding offensive of 1942, was timed eight months to the hour after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Dec. 7, 1941. The Allied world was cheered when it was announced that Marines had landed on the Solomons, almost in Japan's own front yard. Leathernecks who took part in the attack had been carefully picked after months of practice in amphibious landings and jungle fighting, for the war in the Pacific is essentially an amphibious war. Timed to the minute were landings at Tulagi, Gavutu, Tanamboga, and Guadalcanal. In most places the well-entrenched Japanese fought to the last man; in others they were caught so unprepared that they left partly eaten meals in their headlong flight before the Marines.

Raid on Makin Island.

The Marines' invasion of the Solomons was followed by a hit-run raid on Makin Island in the Gilbert Group on Aug. 17, with Lieut. Col. Evans F. Carlson leading his famous "Raiders," a specially trained and armed landing force.

Japanese Attempts to Retake the Solomons.

As 1942 drew to a close the Japanese sent strong fleets to the Solomons area in attempts to retake this highly strategic position, but Marines remained firmly rooted and fought them off, and even acquired new ground. The Japanese made some landings of additional troops, but American fleet and bomber patrols prevented large Japanese troop reinforcements from reaching the Solomons.

U.S. Advances in the Pacific

In the Pacific, U.S. troops retook Attu, in the Aleutians, in a hard-fought, 3-week battle beginning on May 23. (The Japanese evacuated Kiska before Americans and Canadians landed there in August.) The main action was in the southwest Pacific. There U.S. and New Zealand troops, under Admiral William Halsey, advanced through the Solomons, taking New Georgia in August and a large beachhead on Bougainville in November. Australians and Americans under MacArthur drove the Japanese back along the East Coast of New Guinea and took Lae and Salamaua in September. MacArthur's and Halsey's mission, as set by the JCS in 1942, had been to take Rabaul, but they discovered in the Solomons that having command of the air and sea around them was enough to neutralize the Japanese Island garrisons and render them useless. Landings on Cape Gloucester, New Britain, in December, in the Admiralty Islands in February 1944, and At Emirau Island in March 1944 effectively sealed off Rabaul. Its 100,000-man garrison could not thereafter be either adequately supplied or evacuated.